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This paper examines the theoretical rationale for a new form 
of organisation appearing in the car industry. This form is charac­
terised by horizontal as well as vertical communication, incentives 
based on ability rather than on productivity, and a cooperation of 
the divisions of large corporations. I show in a duopoly model tha t 
such horizontal information Hows are optimal when the production 
technology is flexible, th a t is when there are large factor comple­
mentarities. This organisational form enabled Japanese producers 
to  maintain a  com petitive advantage in terms of tim e-to-market and 
rate of product renewal. Therefore, innovation is not only techno­
logical. but also organisational.
*1 wish to thank Prof. S. Martin, my supervisor, for constructive comments at 
various stages of this work. Prof. Bianchi (Bologna University) brought precious advice. 
All remaining errors are mine. Financial support was provided by the Lavoisier grant 
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1 Introduction
Jacquemin (1996) points to the different dimensions of both competitiv- 
ity and innovation. In the car industry, competitivity, that is, the ability 
to gain market share, is determined by the variety, quality and cost of 
models, together with the time-to-market (time between conception and 
commercial launch of models) and rate of product renewal. The flexible 
production system that was initiated by Japanese producers is optimal to 
produce variety and quality at low cost. This system has been adopted 
by major producers in the West, yet Japanese producers keep their ad­
vantage, especially in terms of time-to-market and rate of product renewal 
(Fujimoto, 1994). Why ?
The answer lies in the point raised by Jacquemin: innovation is not only 



























































































the large re-organisations that have been carried out by automakers 
since the late 1980s are converging toward a new form of organisa­
tion, characterised mainly by horizontal as well as vertical informa­
tion flows, new incentives, and a certain decentralisation of the large 
corporation. This form looks like a network, and therefore I call it a 
N-fc.rm, in contrast with the multidivisional form (M-form) outlined 
by Williamson (1975). Organisational forms of Japanese producers 
have included this horizontal communication for a long time, and I 
argue that this provided them with the appropriate framework to 
turn quickly innovations into commercial success.
2 The N-form
2.1 D efin ition
The N-form is characterised by multidirectional information flows, 
incentives based on skills rather than attached to jobs, and decen­
tralisation of strategic local decisions to regional divisions. Given the 
flexible production system, and the need for producers to “globalise”, 
that is being present in all world markets (to compensate downs in 
some markets by ups in others) and in all segments (producing the 
whole range of car models), horizontal information flows are necessary 
to exploit complementarities. Regional divisions share experience to 
avoid duplication of effort and exploit their complementary experi­
ence. The top hierarchy is flatter for more rapid and more dense 
information flows, thereby saving time to develop products.
Incentives change, and job rotation replace climbing the hierarchy of 
the traditional organisational form. Labory (1997) has shown em­
pirically the emergence of the new form, with Honda as a typical 
example. The next section analyses this form inside the theory of 
the firm, and section 3 shows its superiority in a duopoly model of 




























































































2.2 T h eoretica l R ation a le  for th e  N ew  Form
In this section, I attempt to provide a theoretical rationale for this 
new organisation. I show that organisational forms distribute power 
and authority inside the firm, thereby determining the structure of 
information flows inside the firm, hence both information processing 
and agency costs. The production organisation,
• is determined in order to meet performance requirements (e.g. 
requirements of variety, quality, low time-to-market are best 
met by flexible production system);
• determines production costs;
• has a corresponding best top level organisation.
The sum of production, agency, and information (processing) costs is 
the organisational cost, which determines the nature of the superior 
organisational form.
Economic theory has always been concerned with providing explana­
tions for organisational forms and more broadly for the existence of 
firms. Three main approaches can be found in the literature. The 
neoclassical approach sees the firm only from the viewpoint of the 
market. The firm is a technological blackbox that uses inputs (labour, 
capital and land) to produce outputs. Coase (1937) in his seminal 
paper makes a breakthrough in the theory by casting the issue of the 
reasons for the existence of firms in terms of economies specialised in 
trade. He argues that entrepreneurial coordination enables firms to 
reduce the costs associated with market transactions, including infor­
mation costs arising in the search for equilibrium prices. Williamson 
takes up Coase’s point to develop the transactional approach. He uses 
concepts to analyse agents’ behaviour and decision-making regarding 
the nature of the transactions to be organised. His perspective is that 
of resource allocation: technology is, as in the neo-classical approach, 
given exogenously to the firm.
The third approach is the evolutionary approach (Teece et ah, 1994, 
and Winter, 1995). It is dynamic, and views the firm as a chang­




























































































past history and their environment. It is argued that over time firms 
build capabilities, learn and adapt to their changing environment, 
thereby accumulating competence.. The survival of firms in indus­
try depends on the competence they accumulate over time, because 
profitability increases with competence, and survivors are the most 
profitable firms. This approach has the advantage of being a dy­
namic approach to the theory of the firm. However, its concepts are 
quite vague. For instance, the concept of competence encompasses 
many aspects of firms’ capabilities: assets, skills of firms’ members, 
efficiency of incentive systems, extent of scale economies, research, 
and so on. This raises some problems for its application to the study 
of alternative organisational forms.
I think that this approach is useful to outline the importance of in­
ternal organisation features in determining firms’ long-term survival 
in industries, in addition to their strategic choices. However, it is too 
vague a concept at firm level, and the theory of the firm can more 
fruitfully build on transaction cost economics and agency theory.
2.2.1 Transactional approach
Williamson argues that agents’ behaviour is based on two main prin­
ciples, namely bounded rationality (individuals’ ability to receive, 
process and stock information is limited and hence the advantage 
of sequential decision-making made possible in organisation through 
hierarchies; the key consequence of bounded rationality is that con­
tracts are incomplete), and opportunism (self-interested individu­
als are controlled and coordinated in organisations thereby enabling 
some saving on transaction costs arising in markets). Transactions 
differ according to both the limits they impose on agents’ decision­
making ability and the room they leave for opportunistic behaviour. 
The best form of organisation is then determined by the nature of 
transactions, that is the specificity of assets engaged in the transac­
tion, the uncertainty and frequency of the transactions. The transac­
tional approach therefore explains why internalisation is substituted 
for the market; it also explains how internal organisation features 




























































































Williamson defines two main forms of organisation, the U-form and 
the M-form, referring to empirical studies of A. Chandler. The U- 
form as illustrated in figure 1 has the CEO making both strategic 
and operational decisions. When the firm’s activities grow, the effi­
ciency of this form is limited by the bounded rationality of the CEO, 
who can no longer handle all decisions, and by the opportunism of 
managers of functional units who have some scope for pursuing their 
own interests. This leads to a control loss. Hence the multidivisional 
form, which firms like Dupont and General Motors were pioneers in 
adopting in the 1920’s, is preferred. The advantage of this form is 
that decisions are divided: the head office concentrates on strate­
gic issues, while divisional managers make all operational decisions. 
Therefore the CEO is not overwhelmed, and divisional managers are 
better controlled, since their performance can be monitored by the 
head office as long as demand is not too volatile or random. An­
other fundamental advantage of the M-form is that the capital mar­
ket is internalised: divisional managers make proposals of investment 
projects, and the head office allocates funds to the projects with high­
est expected returns. Divisional managers then compete for funus, 




























































































Figure 1. Organisational Forms
(a) U-form
(b) M-form
| Head Office [

































































































































































































The difference in organisational forms adopted by firms may be due 
to their incurring different costs of carrying out activities. Dem- 
setz (1995) argues that it might be useful to distinguish the types 
of costs arising in both organisations and markets. Thus transaction 
costs should refer to costs arising in market transactions only. Dem- 
setz suggests the term management costs to refer _o costs arising in 
organisations. I prefer the term organisational costs, because man­
agement costs may be misinterpreted as costs arising at management 
level only. Organisational costs include agency, information process­
ing and production costs. 1’he latter point to another link between 
firm structure and market structure. In the 1920’s, General Motors 
adopted the M-form because it provided an efficient way of producing 
different types of cars. That is, GM recognised the potential profit 
to be made by differentiating cars, in contrast to the single black 
Ford-T model. Thus the M-form was adopted because it could meet 
the performance requirements (differentiation) at lowest cost. Firm 
structure is chosen to optimise a firm’s position on market, thereby 
influencing market structure.
2.2.2 The M-form in the 1990s
In the 1990’s, competition is intense and products have to be de­
veloped rapidly, because firms’ environment is uncertain, fluctuating 
according to business cycles, and depending on random exchange 
rates. This raises the issue of the optimality of the M-form in this 
context. In that form of organisation, with autonomous divisions, it 
is difficult for the head office to assess the performance of divisions. 
Bad luck (unexpected changes in consumers’ tastes for instance) and 
lack of effort from the manager are difficult to distinguish. Hence 
a moral hazard problem arises that has to be solved by appropriate 
incentives. The principal-agent literature analyses this problem of 
incentive setting, finding contracts that induce managers to reveal 
their true performance. By contrast, the greater responsibility (local 
strategic decisions in addition to operational decisions) given to re­
gional managers in the new form induces them to exert effort, while 




























































































duplications of effort. Horizontal as well as vertical information flows 
yield an efficient monitoring. Consequently, agency costs decline.
This outlines one type of organisational cost: agency cost, arising 
because of asymmetric information between opportunistic firm mem­
bers, and solved by internal monitoring.
Besides, when the time-to-market of products is a key determinant 
of market shares, it is important that decisions be made rapidly to 
react to a move of a rival in the regional market. In the M-form, 
all such strategic decisions are made at the head office and therefore 
time is lost in communicating information vertically (as shown on 
the above figure) to the head and get its feedback. In contrast, the 
N-form allows regional managers, individually or jointly, to make 
some strategic decisions, whenever this reduces the time-to-market 
of products. However, the head office or coordinator of the network 
makes long-term strategic decisions, such as the choice of entry into 
new markets, or research as to a fundamental innovation in product 
or process, such as the electric car (the regional units being in charge 
with incremental innovations in product or process)1.
This defines a second important type of cost: information processing 
costs, due to the bounded rationality of agents.
The major difference between the M- and N-forms lies in the rela­
tionship among different parts of the organisation. In the N-form, 
information flows are both horizontal and vertical, making possible 
for the co-ordinator (head office) a further delegation of decisions to 
regional units, while keeping control over them, by appropriate in­
centives and double monitoring (horizontal and vertical, as shown at 
the bottom of figure 1). The activities of the co-ordinator office re­
quires less personnel, thereby saving in labour costs. Micromarketing 
(products targeted at particular groups of consumers, with different 
products in different regions) is done by each regional units, that 
is close to markets, hence a higher probability of offering the right
’It should be noticed that the N-form concept applies not only to the car 
industry, but also to high-tech sectors like telecommunications. Thus ATT re­
cently conducted a 'strategic désintégration” (Robert Allen, president), by giving 
more financial autonomy to the divisions, thereby inducing a higher ’’commercial 




























































































product at the right time. The co-ordinator carries out long-term 
planning, monitoring of divisions, allocation of resources (personnel, 
funds, facilities). Therefore, the N-form appears as superior to the 
M-form because it saves on organisational costs, when the production 
requirements are variety and low time-to-market. Both agency and 
information processing costs are lower in the new form. The next 
section analyses information processing costs more precisely.
2.2.3 Transaction costs revisited
The difference between the multidivisional and the network forms 
can be summarised as follows.
Table 10. Main differences between the M-Form and the N- 
Form
M-Form N-Form
vertical interactions only Multiple interactions
separation o f functions co-ordination o f functions
limited delegation large delegation
rationale: co-ordination inside firm 
saves on transaction costs due to 
bounded rationality and 
opportunism o f firm’s members
rationale: concentration on core 
activities to minimise transaction 
costs
Integration o f suppliers partnership relationships




























































































Table 11. Incentives associated 
Form
with the M-Form and the N-
M-Form N-Form
compensation 
wage and promotion same compensation
promotion: climbing the 
hierarchical ladder
promotion: job rotation
limited delegation: low incentives 
at lower levels (low risk)
large delegation: higher motivation 
(horizontal risk sharing)
vertical monitoring monitoring by both horizontal and 
vertical control
small span o f control 
(many hierarchical levels)
increased span o f control
Notice that the cooperation between division in the N-form is in­
duced without additional incentives. As shown in section 3, comple­
mentarities in production make it profitable for divisional managers 
to cooperate.
Therefore, given (a) the new technology (flexible production system, 
which reduces production costs relative to the rigid production sys­
tem); and (b) the more intense competition (initially from Japanese 
producers and recently form Korean producers); it is less costly (and 
time saving) to delegate more decisions to the regional facilities, to 
organise horizontal as well as vertical information flows, concentrate 
on core activities, i.e. to structure as an N-form because this min­
imises organisational costs.
The relative organisational costs of the U-, M- and N-forms can be 




























































































Table 12. Organisational Costs
U-Form VI-Form N-Form
A g e n c y  C osts  
(m on itorin g  
and in cen tives
zero: no  
d elegation
lo w  in M P*  
high in FP*
low : d ouble  
m on itorin g
Production
costs
lo w  in M P  
high  in FP
lo w  in M P  
high  in FP
lo w  in FP
Inform ation
costs
very  h igh  
(entrepreneur  
h an d les all 
k n o w led g e )
h igh  in  FP  
and
glob a lisa tion
lo w  in FP  
and
g lo b a lisa tio n
*: MP = mass production, FP = flexible production; globalisation = 
presence in all regional markets in ali market segments.
When the performance requirements are production of homogenous 
goods at low cost, mass production is optimal, exploiting large economies 
of scale. In the U-form, one person handles all information and takes 
all decisions. Therefore, when the number of markets in which the 
firm sells increases, the cost of processing information rises rapidly, 
since there is no delegation. In contrast, the M-form creates one 
division per product or region, delegating operational decisions to 
divisional managers, so that information processing costs are lower.
As long as demand and factor spillovers between divisions are low, 
the performance of the divisions can be compared and monitored, 
and agency costs are low. In short, under mass production total 
organisational costs are lower in the M-form.
However, when the product is differentiated, and needs to be devel­
oped rapidly because of intense competition, the flexible production 
system carries lower production costs than the mass production sys­
tem. Further, it has been shown that double monitoring and higher 
incentives arising in the N-form, due to more responsibility given to 
divisions and to their cooperation, result in smaller agency costs. 
The higher delegation as well as the higher number of communica­





























































































Therefore, the sum of production, agency and information costs, that 
is, the organisational cost, is lower in the N-form with flexible pro­
duction and globalisation, than in the M-form. An attempt at for­
malising this point is carried out in the next section.
3 A D uopoly M odel of the N-Form
This section formalises the lower agency costs arising in the new 
form relative to the multidivisional form under the flexible production 
system.
Faulli-Oler and Giralt (1995) study a principal-agent duopoly where 
firms are multidivisional and multiproduct. They assume the profits 
of the divisions are correlated, because of both market spillovers (due 
to the substitutability of the divisional products) and factor spillovers 
due to complementarities in production. Their model is interesting 
because they show how owners can induce their divisional managers 
to cooperate by setting appropriate incentive schemes. Whether di­
visions are induced to cooperate depends on the extent of spillovers 
and other duopoly competition parameters.
They consider two firms, A and B, with two divisions producing one 
product each. Products are denoted 1 and 2. 27, i — 1,2, is the total 
sales of good i. Demand is given by
P i =  a — (3x\ —  7 1 2  (1 )
P2 =  a -  fix2 — 727
where 7 represents market spillovers, and a > 0, fi > 7 > 0. The 
lower 7 , the more divisions’ products are independent. Costs are 
assumed quadratic: for
j  = a , b ,
C\j = MjX\j + (d + e)xlj - ex\jXij (2)





























































































a > Ma > M n > 0
d > 0, e
oAl
e 7
Hence Faulli-Oler and Giralt consider negative market spillover and 
positive factor spillovers, because complementarity in production is 
usually associated with product substitutability.
Faulli-Oler and Giralt then assume that the incentive scheme A is 
such that each divisional manager maximises the objective function 
£2, with
j — If ij -f XjYlhj 
i .h  = 1, 2, i ^  h 
j  = A,D
The problem with this incentive scheme is that owners do not earn 
anything, but rather get negative profit: they give each divisional 
manager all the divisional profit plus part of the other division’s 
profit. Faulli-Oler and Giralt claim that
“if Xj — 0 , managers are remunerated as if they were the owners of 
their division, simplifying thus the flow of information across units 
and making the manager more responsive to the environment”(p82).
What the authors mean is probably that owners base managers’ com­
pensation scheme on 0, giving them a fraction, say a, of £2. Then 
maximising <r£2 is equivalent to maximising £2.
If the “N-form” hypothesis makes sense it should be possible in this 
model to find cases where spillovers and other competition’s para­
meters induce divisional managers to cooperate even if this is not 




























































































Therefore I model the incentive of divisional managers to cooperate, 
in the same framework as that of Faulli-Oler and Giralt, but where 
managers maximise their divisional profit, of which they get a fraction 
a and owners get fraction (1 — a). I assume demand is given by
Pi =  a — bx\ — b9x2 (3)
P2 =  a — bx2 — b6x\
where 9 represents market spillovers (degree of substitutability be­
tween good 1 and good 2). I prefer this formulation because it dis­
tinguishes between the slope of the demand curve and the spillovers, 
unlike the formulation of Faulli-Oler and Giralt. Costs are given by
Ci} = MjX\j + (d + e)x\j -  exXjX2] (4)
C2j = MjX2j + (d + e)xlj -  exX]X2]
with
a > m a > Mq > 0
d > 0, e
oAl
e b9
for j  = A, B.
3.1 C ase o f au ton om ou s d iv ision s
This is the case of a duopoly where two M-forms with autonomous 
divisions compete.
Consider the manager of division 1, firm A. He maximises profit




























































































The strategic relationships defined by Bulow et al. (1985) are given 
in this model by:
dxXAdx2A
e -b O (6)
If this derivative is strictly positive, the goods in firm A are strategic 
complements: a division’s demand in one market is complementary 
to the other division’s demand in a second market.
d2n lA
dx\Adx\B (7)
This represents the change in the marginal profitability of firm A 
resulting from being a bit more aggressive when firm B is more ag­
gressive. Since it is negative, firm A regards its product as a strategic 
substitute to B’s. The strategies between firms are strategic substi­
tutes because goods are substitutes.
I consider the case where e — 6# > 0, that is where spillovers between 
divisions are positive.
The first-order condition is
anM
dx lA
a — 2bx\A — bx\B — b6x2 — MA — 2 (d +  e)x\A + ex2A =  0
Hence the reaction function,
2(6 +  d + e)x\A =  a — bx\B — b0x2 — MA +  ex2A (8)
by symmetry, other reaction functions are computed as,
2(6 + d + e)x2A =  a — 
2(b + d + e)xiB - a — 
2(b + d + e)x2B =  a — I
b x 2B —  b O x i  — M a  +  e x \ A 
b x \ A —  bO x2 —  A / f j  -f- c x 2b  
b x 2A —  1)0x i —  M b  T  £ X \ b
0 )





























































































%1A — X 2A — X IB  — X 2B
and the reaction functions can be added two by two to get 
2(6 +  d +  e)x\ = 2a — bxx — 260X2 — 2A/ + e i 2
2(6 + d + e)x2 = 2  a — 6x2 — 2b6x\ — 2 M  +  exi 
Combining the two equations one gets equilibrium output x ’X) 
. _  2 (a -  M)
Equilibrium divisional output increases when 6 reduced, that is when 
the products become more independent. Similarly, divisional output 
increases as factor spillovers reduce.
Now replacing x.\ and x2 by their equilibrium values in the price equa­
tions gives equilibrium prices, from which equilibrium profits can be 
computed. By symmetry, I compute the price and profit of division 
1 in firm A.
Prices are given by
x
6(3 + 20) +  2 d + e
Hence
(a -  M)
(10)
6(3 +  20) +  2d +  e
(11)
and profits




























































































(12). _  [6 + d + e] (a -  A/ ) 2 
1/1 ~  [6(3 +  20) +2d + e]2
If 9 = 0, d, e = 0, one finds the usual formula for equilibrium quanti­
ties, prices and profits in a Cournot duopoly. Equilibrium divisional 
profits are lower when products are substitutes. In other words, when 
divisional managers work independently, their divisional profits de­
crease with a rise in market spillovers. Divisional profits also fall 
when factor spillovers increase (e), but by a smaller amount. Low 
factor and market spillovers are the conditions prevailing in mass 
production: divisions are defined by product, that is, each division 
represents a model in the range, so that there is neither factor nor 
market spillovers (no substitutability between small and large cars, 
for instance). Divisionalisations like those of GM and Ford before 
the 1990s are then optimal.
Therefore as market and factor spillovers get larger (which is the 
case in flexible production, where the divisions produce for the same 
segments but for different regions), divisional managers may find it 
profitable to cooperate, since their performance falls if they work in­
dependently.
3.2 C ase o f  C oop era tin g  D iv ision s
This is the case of a duopoly with two N-forms. Divisional managers 
coordinate their efforts and maximise their joint profit, that is
nc = lIm + U2A
Given the assumed demand and cost functions,
Ilc =  (a — bx 1 — b0x 2)x\A — M x \a — (d + e)x^A + ex\AXiA + 
(a — bx2 — b0x\)x2A — M x2a — (d + e)x\A +  ex\AX2A
(13)




























































































Managers set x \a and x.2a simultaneously to maximise 0 C. First- 
order conditions are then
<9H
dx\— =  a-2bxiA-bxin-b0x2-M-2(d+e)xiA+ex2A-bQx2A+ex.2A = 0
d n r.
a —2bx2A—bx2n—l>0xl —M —2(d+e)x2A+ex\A—b0x\A+cx\A — 0
0 x 2 A
These can be written as
2 (b + d + e)x\A — a — M  — bx m  — b0x2n — 2(b0 — e)x2 a (14)
2(6 + d + e )x 2 a =  a — M  — 6x2/3 — b0x,\n — 2(b0 — e)x\A (15) 
Adding divisional output in each firm, one obtains
(6(1 + 9) + d) xa — a — M — 6(1 + 9)xn
By symmetry,
(6(1 + 9) + d) xn =  a — M  — 6(1 +  9)xa
Combining these two equations, equilibrium outputs are computed 
as
— M
''\A — x 2A — Xl n — X2D — 2 (d +  6(1 +  9)) (16)
Output is therefore independent of the factor spillovers parameter e. 
In order to compare divisional outputs when managers work indepen­




























































































X c — X i  =
[e -  6(1 +  29)] (a -  M)
2 (d + 6(1 + 0)) (6(3 +  26») +  2d + e] 
This is positive if and only if
> 0 (17)
e > 6(1 +  29)
since it is assumed that a > M, and since the denominator of the 
fraction is positive. Therefore if factor spillovers are higher than 
market spillovers, each division produces higher output if they coop­
erate rather than working independently. I now calculate equilibrium 
prices and profits in order to compare the two cases. These are,
and
Pi =
ad +  6(1 +  9)M 
d + 6(1 +  0)
(18)
d(a -  M )2 
4 (d + 6(1 + 9))2
(19)
Now let flc be the divisional profit from cooperation, and 11/ the 
divisional profit from independent efforts. Their difference is
j-[ n  — d{a -  M )2 [b + d + e](a -  M )2 
c ~ ' ~  4 (d +  6(1 +  9 ) f  ~  [6(3 + 29) + 2d + e]2
If e =  0, there is no complementarity in production of the two prod­
ucts, and the above difference is equal to
n c -  n ,  =  - 6  [d{3 + 40) +  46(1 + 0)2] < 0 (20)
Therefore, if there are no factor spillovers but the products of the two 
divisions have a certain degree 9 of substitutability, it is more prof­
itable for both the managers and the owners to work independently.




























































































n c- n ,  =  de2- 6  [d(3 +  40) + 46(1 + 0)2] — 2e [2d2 +  262(1 +  Of  +  db{l + 20)]
hence for d > 0,
nc > fl/
if and only if
P = de2 — Ae — B > 0
with
A =  2 [2d2 +  262(1 + 0)2 + d6(l +  2(9)] 
B = 6[d(3 +  40) +46(1 +0)2}
The roots of P are
- A  -  V A 2 + 4dB - A  +  s fW T J d B  
2d ’ 2d
Hence P  > 0 for e outside the above interval, that is,
-A-VA'i+MB
c — 2d____
—A + V  A'*+4dB 
e — 2 d
Since e > 0, the result is that
nc > n/
if and only if
e >
- A +  sJA2 +  4 dB 
2d
( 2 2 )
for A and B as given above. 




























































































Proposition 1: Divisional managers find it profitable to cooperate for 
any given share of profit (incentive) they get if and only if, for A and 
B given by 21,
e > - A  + \A42 +  4 dB 
2d
In other words, for a sufficiently high level of complementarity in pro­
duction of the two divisions, divisional managers find it profitable to 
cooperate whatever their compensation. The minimum level of fac­
tor spillovers for which cooperation is profitable depends on demand 
parameters, namely the slope of the demand function and the degree 
of substitutability of the products of each division, as well as the 
economies of scale (parameter d in the quadratic cost function). The 
lower the economies of scale, the lower the threshold level of factor 
spillovers needs to be for cooperation to be induced. Also, the higher 
the market spillovers between divisions, the higher e needs to be to 
automatically make cooperation between managers more profitable 
to them and to the firm.
This provides a theoretical rationale for the cooperation of regional 
divisions in the new form of organisation appearing in the automo­
bile industry nowadays. Flexible production exploits and increases 
factor spillovers, hence e increases and cooperation between divisions 
is more profitable.
Notice that this framework can be used to analyse entry deterrence 
issues. Schwartz and Thompson (1986) and d’Aspremont and Michel 
(1990) show that delegation can be used credibly to deter entry. Most 
models of entry deterrence by holding excess capacity imply that 
the informed incumbent generally allows entry, because the deter­
rent is not profitable. By contrast, if the incumbent can duplicate 
the potential entrant’s behaviour by creating a new division, both 
Schwartz and Thompson and d’Aspremont and Michel show that the 
incumbent always prevent entry. The former authors then use this 
argument to explain General Motors’ divisionalisation until the mid- 




























































































very independent divisions, that according to Schwartz and Thomp­
son were preventing entry. However, entry of Japanese automakers 
in the 1970s was not deterred because the latter producers had an 
absolute cost advantage due to their flexible production technology. 
Consequently delegation is an important type of commitment that 
provide an organisational solution to the credibility problem of idle 
capacity models of entry deterrence.
3 .3  D u o p o ly  w ith  an N -form  and a M -form
In this section, I analyse a duopoly where one N-form and one M- 
form compete. In the latter form, divisional managers make output 
decisions independently, maximising their own divisional profit. In 
the N-form, managers maximise the sum of the divisions’ profits. For 
instance, the M-form with autonomous divisions is General Motors 
(firm B), and the N-form is Honda (firm A), which has been shown 
to be a typical case of this model.
In firm A, managers maximise
n„ = nM + na„
yielding reaction functions,
2(6 +  d +  e)x\ a = a — Ma — bx\B — bOx^u — 2(60 — e)x2A (23)
2(6 +  d + e ) x 2A =  a — MA — bx,2n —  b6x\B  — 2(b6 — e)x\A (24)
In firm B, managers maximise divisional profits independently, yield­
ing reaction functions,
2(6 + d + e)xm = a -  Mn -  bx\A -  b0x2A — (60 -  e ^ e  (25)




























































































Since both divisions in each firm face the same cost conditions, 1 
consider symmetric equilibria, where
x \ b  — X 2 B
then (23) and (24) as well as (25) and (26) can be added, to get
[6(1 + 0) +  d\xA =  a -  Ma -  6(1 + 6)xB (27)
and
6(2 +  6) + 2d +  e
x B — a -  M b -  6(1 4- 6)x a (28)
This reaction functions can be represented as in the following figure, 
where it is assumed that MA =  M B = 1; a =  10; 6 =  d = e = 1.
(27) and (28) can be solved for equilibrium outputs:
» _  , _  a. — (2 +  9)Mb +  (1 +  6)Ma 
x i b  -  X2B -  (2 +  0)(4 +  0 + e) -2 (1  + 0 ) 2
and
* * (2 — 6 e)a — (4 + 6 -b e)M/\ 2(1 -1- 9)Mn
x \ a  -  X 2A -  2 [ ( 2  +  <9)(4 +  6> +  e )  - 2 ( 1  +  6 ) 2}
Hence
* + (e — 0)a — (2 + 6 — e)M/\ -- 2M r
x iA -  x iB -  2[(2 +  6»)(4 + 6 +  e) — 2(1 + 6)2}
This is positive for e sufficiently large. More precisely, for
e >
2 (MA + M n)
o, + Ma
equilibrium outputs in firm A’s divisions are higher than in firm B, 
the M-form. This confirms the fact that the flexible production sys­
tem is advantageous because it exploits factor spillovers between divi­




























































































Equilibrium prices in division 1 are then, normalising both b and d 
to l ,2
. a[2(2 + 9){4 + 9 +  e) -  4(1 + 9)2 -  (1 + 6){4 -  9 + e)]
P' ~  2[(2 + 0)(4 +  0 +  e) — 2(1 + 9)2}
(1 +  9){2 - 9  + e)MA + 2(1 + 9)MB 
+ 2[(2 + 9)(4 + 9 + e) — 2(1 + 9)2}
Now equilibrium profits can be compared as follows. 
In firm A,
n M = P\X\A -  Max \a -  (e + l)(a:tA)2 +  e^ , , ) 2 
since x \A = x*2A.
n M = (P\ ~ m a ~ x \a )x \a
Similarly,
— (Pi Af/j x lB)x1B
Given that equilibrium outputs are higher in firm A, it follows that 
equilibrium profits are higher in firm A than in firm B. Figure 6 below 
shows that the cooperation between divisions shifts firm A’s reaction 
curve upward, increasing its output at the expense of the rival. This 
is profitable as long as the shift is small and firm B does not react 
aggressively.
Therefore, a N-form earns higher profit than a M-form in a Cournot 
duopoly.


































































































































































































The main rationale for the new organisational form is therefore that 
given the new conditions appearing mainly in the 1980s, namely a 
new technology and new competitors, it minimises transaction costs. 
More precisely, the N-form introduces some market incentives that 
optimise motivation and coordination inside the firm while reducing 
organisational costs. The increasing intensity of competition makes 
high variety and low time-to-market key factors of long-term perfor­
mance, and this is achieved at low cost in the N-form: the flexible pro­
duction system and larger information flows reduce both information 
and production costs, while the cooperation between divisions and 
their frequent interactions lower agency costs (by increasing agents’ 
effort without changing compensation). The key factor for the or­
ganisational efficiency of the N-form is that it optimises information 
flows.
Globalisation means being present in all world markets and all market 
segments. This raises the complexity of activities, and therefore it is 
optimal to delegate more decisions to lower levels of the firms’ hierar­
chy, in order for higher levels not to be overwhelmed (too much infor­
mation to process). Besides, the interactions between functions and 
between divisions, both horizontally and vertically, provides monitor­
ing at low cost. Hence organisational costs are reduced. These are 
further reduced by a decrease in the extent of bureaucracy and in the 
number of hierarchical levels, and by a greater motivation of those 
executives who are given more responsibilities. Lastly, the concen­
tration on core activities by establishment of long-term relationships 
with suppliers, but not vertical integration, shifts both some organi­
sational and some R&D costs to suppliers.
The increased delegation of decisions to regional divisions, especially 
strategic decisions concerning the local market (that maximise the 
speed of response to local market changes), has a further advantage. 




























































































by an induced cooperation between divisions, sharing R&D and man­
agement experiences. The duopoly model developed in this paper 
shows that such cooperation is induced when factor spillovers (com­
plementarity in the production of the divisions) are high and market 
spillovers are negative (substitutability of the divisions’ products), for 
given disutility of effort of managers. The model shows that when 
factor spillovers are high relative to demand spillovers, the N-firm 
earns higher profit in a Cournot duopoly than a M-firm.
As for the multidivisional form, the “new” form explained in this 
case study may translate into different characteristics according to 
the individual firm considered. Such characteristics depend notably 
on the firm’s history. However, the general features should be those 
defined in this study.
Further research includes the empirical and theoretical analysis of 
both incentive systems and organisational costs across firms. This 
would provide further evidence on the evolution of organisational 
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